In 1998, Tseng and Jan proposed a lightweight interactive user identification protocol based on ID-based cryptography. Recently, Hwang et al. modified their protocol to reduce the responding and waiting time for wireless network applications. In this letter, we show that their scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attacks.
Introduction
In 1984, Shamir [6] introduced a new concept, namely IDbased cryptography, which relates user's public key to its ID such as user's name, e-mail address or social security number. Based on this concept, many researchers have devoted themselves to developing various ID-based schemes. The major advantage of these schemes is that there is no requirement for a trusted third party to authenticate user's public key.
In 1991, Maurer and Yacobi [3] proposed a new ID-based public-key distribution system which is a noninteractive protocol. It is based on a novel trapdoor oneway function. However, a flaw of the scheme was found and modification was proposed in literature [2] , [4] . The final version was presented in 1996 [5] .
In 1998, Tseng-Jan proposed a user identification scheme [7] , which improved the squaring method in Maurer-Yacobi scheme. However Hwang et al. [1] argue that in the wireless environment, since the capacity of the battery of a mobile device is limited the waiting and responding time must be reduced. And a one-pass improvement suitable for wireless environment is proposed.
In this letter, we show that Hwang et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attacks. More precisely, if an adversary intercepts previous identification messages from a user, then he can forge another identification message to impersonate that user. Therefore, dispute between the service providers and the users is unavoidable if the scheme is adopted in a system with service changes or used for retrieving confidential information. 
Review of Hwang et al.'s Scheme
In Hwang et al.'s scheme, a trusted authority is used to generate system parameters. There are four primes (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ) between 60 and 70 decimal and for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, (p i − 1)/2 are odd and pair-wise relatively prime. Moreover, the length of these primes are small enough such that computing the discrete logarithm problem is feasible, but factoring the product
Other parameters selected by the trusted authority are as follows.
φ:
Euler's totient function. Step 1 Choose a random number k from Z * N , and compute
e, d, t and v: integers in
where T is the current timestamp.
Step 2 Send {(ID m Y Z), T } to BS.
If it holds, BS confirms that M is valid. Hwang et al.'s scheme is more efficient than TsengJan's scheme since it simultaneously processes the parameters Y and Z. However, the correlation between these two parameters disappears. Therefore, it opens the door for adversaries to generate a valid login message with the current timestamp. In the following section, we show how to successfully launch such an impersonation attack. Step 1 A computes:
ks m TT mod N where T is the current timestamp.
Step 2 Moreover, the attacker can simply take a random number α, compute Y = Y αT mod N and Z = Z αT mod N, then {(ID m Y Z ), T } will be still valid.
It seems to us that there is no simple way to fix this weakness without modifying all equations. In this situation, it is necessary to make tradeoff between performance and security.
